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ABSTRACT 
 
Fault trees and event trees are widely used in industry to model and to evaluate the reliability of safety systems. 
Detailed analyzes in nuclear installations require the combination of these two techniques. This work uses the 
methods of fault tree (FT) and event tree (ET) to perform the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) in research 
reactors. The PSA according to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) is divided into Level 1, Level 2 
and level 3. At Level 1, conceptually safety systems act to prevent the accident, at Level 2, the accident 
occurred and seeks to minimize the consequences, known as stage management of the accident, and at Level 3 
are determined consequences. This paper focuses on Level 1 studies, and searches through the acquisition of 
knowledge consolidation of methodologies for future reliability studies. The Greek Research Reactor, GRR - 1, 
was used as a case example. The LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident) was chosen as the initiating event and from 
there were developed the possible accident sequences, using event tree, which could lead damage to the core. 
Furthermore, for each of the affected systems, the possible accidents sequences were made fault tree and 
evaluated the probability of each event top of the FT. The studies were conducted using a commercial 
computational tool SAPHIRE. The results thus obtained, performance or failure to act of the systems analyzed 
were considered satisfactory. This work is directed to the Greek Research Reactor due to data availability.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This work presents a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) applied to the Greek Research 
Reactor (GRR-1) of the National Center for Scientific Research ‘‘Demokritos’’ [1]. The work 
was performed as part of the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) for the Research Reactor [2] 
in view of the development of new research reactors for radioisotopes production. As it 
occurs in any reliability study, statistically non-significant events report add a significant 
uncertainty level in the failure rates and basic events probabilities used on the Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) and in the probabilities of the End State sequence in the Event Tree (ET) 
analysis. In order to model this accident sequences, fault tree and event tree approach was 
employed to reliability analysis of the GRR - 1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) as Initiator 
Event (IE). As a case example, a double-ended rupture of the largest (12’’) pipe connected to 
the bottom of the reactor during full power operation is assumed as the initiator event.  
 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is a classical methodology that describes each 
accident's sequence through events trees (ETs), which combined success and failure of the 
performance or no safety system in an accident or a transient sequence. These initiating 
events result in sequences of the actions and system demands which may be modeled by the 
ETs. The accident consequences of the Nuclear Power Plant status depend on the plant safety 
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systems performance. The evaluation of the safety systems performance needs the component 
information, operational data, human error probability and physical phenomenon influence to 
each accident scenario. An overview of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) methodologies 
used in the nuclear power licensing process and safety studies was introduced by Keller and 
Modarres [3]. 
 
Regardless of all innovations which were performed by this new generation of reactors, the 
possibility of accidents and faults of the security systems still remains. Therefore, committed 
studies should have accomplished in order to analyze the reliability of this plant concerning 
the Design Basis Accidents, which take into account the possibilities of damage for the 
reactor core in the most different accident’s scenarios. To develop the PSA study involving 
an important technique known as event tree approach, it is necessary the study of another 
technique known as fault tree analysis [4], that is the determination of a top event 
characterized by the failure of the present system in the ET.  
 
 
2. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT AND FAULT TREE METHODOLOGIES 
 
 
Quantitative risk analysis is a systematic approach for evaluating likelihood, consequences, 
and risk of adverse events. Quantitative risk analysis based on event and fault tree analyses 
employs two basic assumptions. The first assumption is related to likelihood values of input 
events, and the second assumption is regarding interdependence among the events or basic 
events. Traditionally, event tree and fault tree both use crisp probabilities; however, to deal 
with uncertainties, the probability distributions of input event likelihoods are assumed [5]. 
2.1. Event Tree 
 
An event tree defines an initiating event within the plant. It then examines the course of 
events which follow as determined by the operation or failure of various systems that are 
provided to prevent the core from melting and to prevent the release of radioactivity to the 
environment [6]. 
2.1.1. Fault tree 
A fault tree starts with the definition of an undesired event, such as the failure of a system to 
operate, and then determines, using engineering and mathematical logic, the ways in which 
the system can fail. Using data covering 1) the failure of components such as pumps, pipes 
and valves, 2) the likelihood of operator errors, and 3) the likelihood of maintenance errors, it 
is possible to estimate the likelihood of system failure, even where no data on total system 
failure exist [6].  
 
3.  RESEARCH REACTOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
 
 
This paper presents the study and the results of a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) 
performed for the Greek Research Reactor (GRR1) of the Institute of Nuclear Technology-
Radiation Protection (INT-RP) of the National Center for Scientific Research Demokritos.  
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3.1. Greek Research Reactor (GRR-1) 
 
Reactor GRR-1 is a typical 5 MW pool-type reactor with MTR-type fuel elements [1] [2], 
cooled and moderated with demineralized light water.  In line with the international Reduced 
Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) programme, the core has been recently 
fuelled with Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) elements of U3Si2-Al type [2]. The fuel 
enrichment is 19.75% and the fissile loading is 12.34 g of 
235
U per plate. The equilibrium 
LEU core contains 28 standard fuel elements and 5 control fuel elements, arranged on a 6x9 
element grid plate. Each standard fuel element consists of 18 flat plates. The control fuel 
element is of the same size as the standard element but consists of only 10 plates, thus 
providing an inner gap for the insertion of the control blades. The control material is 
composed of Ag (80%), Cd (5%) and In (15%). The core is reflected by Beryllium on two 
opposite faces and is surrounded by a practically infinite thickness of pool water. One 
graphite thermal column is adjacent to one side of the core. In the middle of the core there is 
a flux trap.  
 
The core is suspended in a 9 m deep water pool of a volume of approximately 300 m. The 
fuel elements are cooled by circulating the water of the pool at a rate of 450 m³ / h. The water 
flows downward through the core, passes through a decay tank and then pumped back to the 
pool through the heat exchangers. A weighted flapper valve attached to the bottom of the core 
exit plenum enables natural circulation through the core in the absence of forced flow 
circulation. Core inlet temperature, i.e. pool water, is not permitted to exceed 45
0
C. Pool 
temperature depends on reactor power, but also as on external temperature, because the latter 
affects heat dissipation in the cooling towers (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Coolant plenum and safety flapper [1]. 
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3.1.1. Determination and selection of plant operating states 
 
This paper focuses on Level 1 studies, and searches through the acquisition of knowledge 
consolidation of methodologies for future reliability studies. The Greek Research Reactor, 
GRR-1, was used as a case example.    
The following plant operation states have been considered: 
 
1. Nominal full power operation (5MW) 
2. Reduced power operation  
3. Start-up operation 
4. Reactor subcritical, reactor pool available 
 
Nominal full power operation is a plant operating state bracketing all others from the safety 
point of view. This is due to the fact that the reactor pool constitutes a large heat sink that is 
always available, regardless of the operating state of the reactor.  
3.1.2. Initiating event selection  
 
An initiating event is an event that creates a disturbance in the plant and has the potential to 
lead to core damage, depending on the successful operation of the various mitigating systems 
in the plant. Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCA) are all events that directly cause loss of 
integrity of the primary coolant pressure boundary. Transient initiators are those that could 
create the need for a reactor power reduction or shutdown and subsequent removal of decay 
heat. 
3.1.3. Safety function 
 
Five basic safety functions incorporate the design of the Greek Research Reactor. Functions 
that aiming at preventing core damage to occur following an initiating event: 
 
1. Control reactivity 
2. Remove core decay heat and stored heat  
3. Maintain primary reactor coolant inventory  
4. Protect containment integrity (isolation, overpressure)  
5. Scrub radioactive materials from containment atmosphere  
 
For each safety function will be presented the corresponding front-line system of the research 
reactor: 
 
1.  Control reactivity - Reactor Protection System (RPS): Automatic and Manual;  
2. Remove core decay heat and stored heat: Primary Heat Removal System, Reactor Pool 
(Natural Convection) and Emergency Core Cooling System; 
3. Maintain primary reactor coolant inventory - Reactor Pool Isolation; 
4. Protect containment integrity: Containment Isolation and Emergency Ventilation System; 
5. Scrub radioactive materials from containment atmosphere: Emergency Ventilation System. 
 
These front-line systems are described in detail the Safety Analysis of the Research Reactor: 
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Reactor Protection System (RPS) - The safety system consists of two independent safety 
channels, the magnet power supply, and the safety circuit with scrams, reverses interlocks 
and alarms. 
 
Primary Heat Removal System - This system performs the basic safety function of heat 
removal from the reactor core both under power operation, as well as, following shutdown.  
 
Reactor pool – Natural Convection - The reactor pool presents a major heat sink capable of 
independently absorbing the heat generated in the core in most of the cases. Natural 
convection is made possible through the opening of a weighted flapper valve sealing the core 
exit plenum. 
  
Emergency Core Cooling System - In the event of a LOCA accident resulting in loss of the 
primary water and core uncovery the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) can spray the 
reactor core through a 5cm diameter pipe with water coming from a 250 m³ storage tank 
located 30 m higher than the surface of the reactor pool. The water tank can be continuously 
filled by the city water. 
  
Containment Isolation - In the event of an emergency, the normal ventilation system of the 
containment stops and the containment is isolated through the automatic closure of all 
existing openings. At the same time the Emergency Ventilation system starts operating. 
  
Emergency Ventilation System - Following a manual scram, the pumps of the ventilation 
system stop and the emergency ventilation starts automatically, removing the possibly 
contaminated air in a rate of 1500 m
3 
/ h. 
 
 
4. LARGE LOCA AS APPLICATION SCRIPTION METHODOLOGIES 
 
 
PSA involves a number of analytical methods. These include the development of event tree 
and fault tree logic models used for analysis of accident sequences. The LOCA (Loss of 
Coolant Accident) was chosen as initiating event for application of the methodologies. It is 
assumed that during full power operation there is a double-ended rupture of the largest (12 
inch) pipe connected to the bottom of the reactor. Event Tree (ET) models the possible 
response of the reactor to loss of coolant. ET (see Figure 2) comprises the following events: 
  
1. LOCA (Initiate Event - IE) - It is assumed that during full power operation there is a 
double-ended rupture of the largest (12’’) pipe connected to the bottom of the reactor.  
2. Availability of reactor protection system - Following LOCA the reactor protection system, 
both automatic and manual systems should shut down the reactor. Success of this event 
results in scram and hence in interruption of the fission chain reaction. 
3. Pool isolation - Following LOCA the pool should be isolated from the cooling system. 
This occurs if the butterfly valves close, either manually or automatically, within 16 min 
following the accident. Successful isolation of the pool from the location of the break results 
in the core being immerged in the pool.  
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4.1. Event and Fault Tree of the LOCA 
 
Since the probability of failure P is generally less than 0.1, the probability of success (1-P1) is 
always close to 1. Thus, the probability associated with the upper (success) branches in the 
tree is assumed to be 1 [7], see Fig. 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Event Tree (ET) for the initiating event LOCA. 
 
The frequency of occurrence of events in a sequence is the product of conditional 
probabilities of the individual events in that chain. In this study, was considered that, the 
successive events in a sequence are independent, then the frequency of a sequence is the 
product of unconditional probabilities of the individual events (so each front-line system has 
P failures as identical) [8]. 
 
The final results in terms of probabilities for all sequences, No. 1 - 17 (Eqs. 1 - 17), in the 
event tree, can be determined multiplying each value of probabilities in the branch, following 
the procedure described as: 
 
Nº. 1 PIE                                                                           (1) 
Nº. 2 - PIE x (1-P1) x (1-P2) x P3 x (1-P5) x (1-P6)                  (2) 
Nº. 3 - PIE x (1-P1) x (1-P2) x P3 x (1-P5) x P6                  (3) 
Nº. 4 - PIE x (1-P1) x (1-P2) x P3 x P5                    (4) 
Nº. 5 - PIE x (1-P1) x P2 x (1-P4)                                 (5) 
Nº. 6 - PIE x (1-P1) x P2 x P4 x (1-P5) x (1-P6)          (6) 
Nº. 7 - PIE x (1-P1) x P2 x P4 x (1-P5) x P6            (7) 
Nº. 8 - PIE x (1-P1) x P2 x P4 x P5           (8) 
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Nº. 9 - PIE x P1 x (1-P2) x (1-P3) x (1-P5) x (1-P6)                                     (9) 
 Nº. 10 - PIE x P1 x (1-P2) x (1-P3) x (1-P5) x P6         (10) 
 Nº. 11 - PIE x P1 x (1-P2) x (1-P3) x P5                                 (11) 
 Nº. 12 - PIE x P1 x (1-P2) x P3 x (1-P5) x (1-P6)           (12) 
 Nº. 13 - PIE x P1 x (1-P2) x P3 x (1-P5) x P6                               (13) 
 Nº. 14 - PIE x P1 x (1-P2) x P3 x P5            (14) 
 Nº. 15 - PIE x P1 x P2 x (1-P5) x (1-P6)           (15) 
 Nº. 16 - PIE x P1 x P2 x (1-P5) x P6            (16) 
 Nº. 17 - PIE x P1 x P2 x P5                 (17) 
All probabilities of failure of each system (P1 - P6) are calculated using the Fault Tree 
methodology (see figs. 3 - 8). The final upper value of the FT is named of top event, and 
expressed by the probability calculated using the Minimal Cut Set (MCS). Fault Tree analysis 
is a technique by which many events that interact to produce other events can be related using 
simple logical relationships (AND, OR, etc.,); these relationships allow a methodical 
structure building that represents the system. Symbols called GATES (AND, OR,..), are used 
to graphically arranging the events into a tree structure, during the synthesis of the tree 
(represented in the Figs 3 - 8 by symbols 1, 2, 3,..., etc.). 
 
Applying this concept in the expressions defined from ET, the final result of each sequence is 
obtained. Frequencies of initiating event (IE) appearing in Event Trees (ET) are estimated 
according to 8 values in IAEA [9]. 
 
Event trees have been used to study the response of the installation to various initiating 
events whereas fault trees have been used in the modeling of safety system failures. 
Therefore, in this section, six fault trees have been developed to model the failure of safety 
systems (see figs. 3 - 8).  
 
Component failures appearing in the fault trees are failures of front-line and support systems. 
The first category of failures comprises failures of components that are usually on-line and 
thus their failure is immediately detectable. The second category of component failures 
corresponds to systems that must operate on demand and hence the unavailability on demand 
is of interest. 
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Figure 3: System fault tree with top event "Reactor protection system failure", in case 
of LOCA. 
 
 
Figure 4: System fault tree with top event "No pool isolation". 
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Figure 5: System fault tree with top event "Natural circulation heat removal failure". 
 
 
Figure 6: System fault tree with top event "Emergency core cooling system failure". 
 
 
Figure 7: System fault tree with top event "Containment system failure". 
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Figure 8: System fault tree with top event "No Emergency ventilation", in case of 
LOCA. 
 
 
5. RESULTS  
 
The studies presented in this chapter, considered a large LOCA GRR - 1 research reactor as a 
case example. A preliminary study pointed out the classical probabilistic safety analysis. We 
have used the systems fault tree approach to determine the top event probability in each 
system, i.e., Reactor Protection System (RPS), Pool Isolation (PI), Natural Circulation Heat 
Removal (NCHR), Emergency CCS (ECCS), Containment Isolation (CI), and Emergency 
Ventilation (EV). Applying the values of the probabilities assigned to each basic event in 
each front line system (see Table 1 - 6), the SAPHIRE computer coding was used and it has 
been calculated the top event probability to each system, considered in the fault tree 
presented (Figs. 3 - 8). In the Table 7, we can see the results of the End State calculated to 
each sequence of the event tree.  
 
The results obtained for each front line system, to probability of the top event, are used to 
calculate the probability of the End State frequency by using the expressions given previously 
for the calculation using ET (section 4.1, Eqs 1 - 17). The probability of Initiator Event (PIE) 
for LOCA is 1.2 E-4 / year [1] [2].  
 
Component failure rates and the corresponding unavailabilities for front-line and support 
systems are given in [2]. The source of the failure rates is the IAEA database [10].  
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Table 1: Description of Basic Events and Probabilities for RPS 
Basic Event Component Failure Identification Probability 
1 B1 – Failure of all 5 rods 2.28E-06 
2 B2 – Failure of electromagnets to disengage 1.92E-06 
3 B3 – NOR no electric power  0.99999 
4 B4 – Gate slow scram fails  6.97E-04 
5 B5 – Relay T3 stuck closed 6.97E-04 
6 B6 – Sensor fails to give signal 2.35E-02 
7 B7 – Relay T1 fails to open 6.97E-04 
8 B8 – No electric power 2.79E-06 
9 B9 – Human error 1.00E-02 
10 B10 – NOR no electric power  0.99999 
11 B11 – No electric power 2.79E-06 
12 B12 – Sensor T2 fails 2.35E-02 
13 B13 – Relay T2 fails to open 6.97E-04 
14 B14 – Sensor fails to give signal 2.35E-02 
15 B15 – Relay T1 fails to open 6.97E-04 
16 B16 – No electric power 2.79E-06 
 
 
Table 2: System Fault Tree with top event "Containment system failure" 
Basic Event Component Failure Identification Probability 
1 B1 – Gates of ventilation system fail 
to remain closed 
1.01E-04 
2 B2 – Doors fail to remain closed 1.44E-05 
3 B3 – Air pump # 2 fails to stop  3.24E-04 
4 B4 – Air pump # 1 fails to stop 3.24E-04 
5 B5 – Air pump # 3 fails to stop 3.24E-04 
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Table 3: System Fault Tree with top event "No pool isolation" 
Basic Event Component Failure Identification Probability 
1 B1 – Operator fails to close manual butterfly valves 1.00E-02 
2 B2 – Manual butterfly valves fail in open position 3.60E-06 
3 B3 – Operator fails to give signal to pneumatic valves  1.00E-02 
4 B4 – No electric power 2.79E-06 
5 B5 – Pneumatic valves fail stuck in open position 8.20E-05 
6 B6 – Human error 1.00E-02 
7 B7 – No electric power 2.79E-06 
8 B8 – Sensor T2 fails 2.35E-02 
9 B9 – Relay T2 fails to open 6.97E-04 
10 B10 – Sensor fails to give signal 2.35E-02 
11 B11 – Relay T1 fails to open 6.97E-04 
12 B12 – No electric power 2.79E-06 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: System Fault Tree with top event "No Emergency ventilation" 
Basic Event Component Failure Identification Probability 
1 B1 – No sinal 8.30E-04 
2 B2 – Human error 1.00E-02 
3 B3 – Filters fail  3.44E-04 
4 B4 – Air pump F failed 2.27E-03 
5 B5 – Two valves (h) fails to open 1.68E-03 
6 B6 – Loss of offsite power 1.00E-04 
7 B7 – AC Generator fails 2.79E-03 
8 B8 – Diesel motor fails 8.20E-03 
9 B9 – Switches fail stuck 3.20E-03 
10 B10 – Human error  1.00E-02 
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Table 5: System Fault Tree with top event "Natural circulation heat removal failure" 
Basic Event Component Failure Identification Probability 
1 B1 – Flapper fails to open (stuck) 1.44E-05 
2 B2 – Wrong weight 1.00E-02 
 
 
Table 6: System Fault Tree with top event "Emergency core cooling system failure" 
Basic Event Component Failure Identification Probability 
1 B1 – Hole in hose 1.20E-04 
2 B2 – Operator fails to connect hose 1.00E-02 
3 B3 – Water valve fails stuck closed  3.60E-06 
4 B4 – No water in tank 1.20E-04 
 
Table 7: Frequency of Release – End State of the Event Tree 
Nº Frequency of Release 
1 1.20E-04 
2 1.18E-06 
3 5.08E-09 
4 1.36E-10 
5 1.26E-06 
6 1.03E-08 
7 5.62E-11 
8 1.51E-12 
9 2.61E-07 
10 1.12E-09 
11 3.01E-11 
12 2.64E-09 
13 1.14E-11 
14 3.31E-13 
15 2.84E-09 
16 1.22E-11 
17 3.29E-13 
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6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Recent studies about severe accidents in conventional research reactors pointed to the very 
low core melt frequency from an initiator event Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) of 1.4E-6 
by year, for Frequency of core damage and 1.16E-2 for Conditional probability of core 
damage (/year), given initiator. 
 
The fault and event tree approach are able to estimate consistent values and thresholds for 
safety assessment as well as to model the high uncertainty level inherent to front-line 
systems. 
 
The data showed on the Table 7, permit us to conclude that the front line systems introduced 
by research reactor, in the event tree (ET) have significantly elevated the safety plant level. 
  
The case study presented here has confirmed the great advantage of applying this 
methodology to the LOCA initiator event in current research reactors and future reactor 
projects for radioisotopes production. 
  
Improvements can be made in new projects of research reactors for radioisotopes production 
using this concept to increase the reliability of the project. 
  
The unavailability of the system also plays an important factor when the nuclear project is 
involved with the production of radioisotopes.  
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